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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Jane Doe, a deputy sheriff in the Luzerne 
County Sheriff‘s Department (the ―Department‖), brought 
this action against appellees Luzerne County (the ―County‖), 
Ryan Foy, who was a deputy chief for the Department at the 
time of the events at issue, and Barry Stankus, who was the 
sheriff of Luzerne County also at that time (collectively, the 
County, Foy, and Stankus are ―County Defendants‖).  Doe 
sought remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claimed, 
among other things, that County Defendants violated both her 
federal constitutional right to privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and her right to be free from unlawful searches 
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and that the 
County failed to properly train its employees.  The District 
Court granted the County Defendants‘ motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing the case in its entirety.  We will reverse 
the District Court‘s order dismissing Doe‘s constitutional 
right to privacy claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
remand the case for further proceedings.  We will affirm the 
District Court‘s order in all other respects.   
I. BACKGROUND 
On September 27, 2007, the Department, which has 
employed Doe as a deputy sheriff since 2002, instructed Doe 
to serve a bench warrant on a resident in Wilkes-Barre, 
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Pennsylvania.  Doe and her partner, Deputy Brian Szumski, 
traveled to and entered the residence, finding it in disarray 
with garbage and even the carcass of a dead cat on the floor. 
Although they did not find the subject of the warrant, they 
were soon to discover other unwelcome residents. 
Upon exiting the residence, Doe noticed that there 
were a multitude of fleas crawling on her and Szumski.  The 
officers radioed the Department‘s headquarters regarding the 
flea encounter and asked for further instructions.  After some 
delay, the Department directed the officers to proceed to a 
nearby Emergency Management Building (―EMA‖) and await 
construction of a temporary decontamination shower.   The 
officers were told to stay inside their police cruiser until Chief 
Deputy Arthur Bobbouine, a superior officer to both Doe and 
Szumski, arrived at the EMA. 
Approximately twenty minutes later, Bobbouine 
arrived at the EMA along with Foy, who was also a superior 
officer to both Doe and Szumski, and Deputies Erin Joyce 
and Michael Patterson.  Foy brought a video camera and 
immediately began to film Doe and Szumski, who both 
remained inside their parked vehicle with the windows up.  
Doe requested to exit the vehicle because of the high 
temperature and the fleas‘ continual biting.  Bobbouine and 
Foy ordered Doe and Szumski to remain in the police cruiser 
to limit the spread of fleas.  Foy continued to film the scene, 
allegedly laughing at Doe and Szumski‘s plight and taunting 
them.  Doe testified at her deposition that she asked Foy to 
stop filming on at least four specific occasions during the 
events in question, but that he continued and told her at least 
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one time to ―shut up‖ because it was for ―training purposes.‖1  
County Defendants, however, assert that Doe never requested 
that Foy stop filming.   
The EMA employees were unable to construct the 
decontamination shower.  Bobbouine therefore instructed Doe 
and Szumski to drive to Mercy Hospital (the ―Hospital‖), 
which was equipped with a decontamination facility.
2
  Once 
at the Hospital, Szumski was taken inside and Doe was told to 
wait in the police cruiser while Szumski underwent the 
decontamination process.  After approximately forty-five 
minutes, Foy radioed Doe and directed her to remove her 
boots and socks, place them in the trunk of the police car, and 
proceed toward the hospital entrance.  As Doe approached, 
Foy exited the Hospital and walked toward her, filming all the 
while.  Doe testified that she again demanded that Foy stop 
filming but that Foy refused and reiterated that he was filming 
                                                 
1
 Foy testified that Bobbouine ordered him to create a training 
video of the ―decontamination process.‖  Foy‘s explanation is, at 
best, suspect.  First, Bobbouine, Foy‘s superior, testified that he 
did not know why Foy was filming.  Second, Deputy Mandy 
Leandri testified that, prior to Bobbouine and Foy leaving to meet 
Doe and Szumski at the EMA, Bobbouine and Foy discussed how 
they would tell everyone they were making a training video so that 
no one would question why they were filming.  Third, as will be 
discussed in more detail infra, Foy uploaded the video and showed 
it to other officers as a joke, not in the context of a training video.  
Finally, no training video was ever produced from the footage Foy 
shot that day.  Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Foy‘s 
―training video‖ explanation was a pretext to mask his misconduct.     
2
 Mercy Hospital is now Geisinger South Wilkes-Barre.   
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for ―training purposes.‖  
Doe entered the Hospital and was met by Joyce, a 
female deputy, who then led her to a large open showering 
room (the ―Decontamination Area‖).  Joyce did not follow 
Doe inside, but stood in the doorway with the door opened 
slightly so that she could read Doe instructions about the 
decontamination process and how to apply special chemical 
shampoo.  Doe did not undress until Joyce finished the 
instructions and closed the door completely (though the door 
could not be locked because it contained no locking 
mechanism).  Doe then showered without incident. 
After Doe completed her shower, she realized that 
there were no towels in the Decontamination Area.  There 
was, however, a roll of thin paper of the type that typically 
covers a doctor‘s examination table.  Doe asserts that this 
paper was semi-transparent or that Doe‘s wet body caused the 
paper to become semi-transparent; County Defendants deny 
both assertions.  Through the closed door, Joyce told Doe to 
wrap the hospital paper around her private areas so that Joyce 
could enter the room and examine Doe to ensure that no fleas 
remained.  Once Doe had complied, Joyce entered, closed the 
door behind her and began inspecting Doe for any surviving 
fleas.  At this point, Doe‘s back was facing the door; most of 
her back, shoulders and legs were completely exposed, and 
the thin paper, which could have been semi-transparent, was 
wrapped around her buttocks and breasts.   
While Joyce examined Doe for fleas, Bobbouine and 
Foy, unbeknownst to the two female deputies, opened the 
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Decontamination Area‘s door approximately a foot and 
observed Doe.  Foy began filming again.  After viewing Doe 
for some unknown period of time, Bobbouine said, in 
reference to a tattoo on Doe‘s back, ―What‘s that shit all over 
your back?‖  Startled, Doe thought this meant that there were 
fleas on her back, and she instinctively turned her head while 
trying to brush fleas away.  As she did so, she caught 
Bobbouine and Foy out of the corner of her eye.  Doe, 
without turning around, yelled at Bobbouine and Foy to leave 
the Decontamination Area.  She then heard either Bobbouine 
or Foy say, ―They are tattoos on her back.  I wonder what 
they say?‖  One of Doe‘s tattoos contains the initials of the 
woman with whom Doe was in a relationship.  Doe, again 
without turning around, yelled at the men to leave the 
Decontamination Area. 
The parties dispute how much of Doe‘s body was 
exposed to Bobbouine and Foy in the Decontamination Area.  
County Defendants claim that only Doe‘s bare back, 
shoulders, legs and arms were observed and filmed, and that 
at no time were Doe‘s breasts or buttocks exposed in the 
Decontamination Area.  Doe alleges that there is evidence 
demonstrating that her breasts and/or buttocks were exposed.  
Doe asserts that an unknown individual was captured on 
video stating that he could see her ―boobies‖ and that 
somebody should grab something to ―cover [Doe] up.‖  Doe 
testified that the outline of her buttocks was visible through 
the wet paper, and that Bobbouine allegedly made a statement 
captured on video that he ―could see [Doe‘s] ass.‖  
  Joyce closed the Decontamination Area‘s door, again 
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shielding Doe from Bobbouine and Foy.  Joyce then 
completed her examination of Doe, who was eventually 
provided with hospital scrubs and transported to the police 
station.   
Later that day, Foy uploaded the video onto his work 
computer and called several officers, both male and female, 
into his office to view the footage.  It is not clear what Foy 
showed those congregated in his office.  Female Deputy 
Mandy Leandri testified that Foy displayed a still image of 
Szumski‘s bare buttocks, which prompted Leandri to leave 
Foy‘s office in disgust.  Foy was unable to recall any details 
about the viewing held in his office other than that Doe was 
present.  Doe, however, testified that she was not present at 
the viewing and had gone home after the incident at the 
Hospital.  Foy saved several still images, as well as the video 
of the day‘s events (collectively, these are the ―Doe Files‖), in 
a public computer folder entitled, ―Brian‘s ass,‖ which Doe 
testified could have been viewed by anyone who had access 
to the Luzerne County network.   
Sometime in April 2008, Leandri rediscovered the 
―Brian‘s ass‖ folder and came across the Doe Files.  Leandri 
testified that she opened one photo of Doe — a close-up of 
Doe‘s back showing her tattoo — which Leandri showed to 
another female deputy and recalled that the two made fun of 
Doe for tattooing her girlfriend‘s initials on to her back.  
Leandri explained that she was ―in shock that [Doe] would 
get someone‘s initials tattooed‖ on her.  Leandri did not, 
however, testify that she was surprised that Doe had a 
girlfriend, nor is there any evidence in the record that, as a 
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result of the September 27 events, anyone learned for the first 
time that Doe had a girlfriend.   
Leandri notified her superior, Sheriff Michael 
Savokinas, of the Doe Files, and he oversaw removal of the 
files.  At the time of its removal, the ―Brian‘s ass‖ folder 
contained five still photos of Doe and Szumski and an edited 
video clip from the events at issue.
3
  Only two of the photos 
depicted Doe: one was the close-up of her bare back and the 
other showed Doe‘s hips, bare back, and bare shoulders.  In 
both photos, the outline of Doe‘s buttocks — covered only by 
thin, wet hospital paper — was visible.   
In June of 2008, Doe filed a complaint against the 
County as a municipal defendant and against defendants Foy 
and Stankus
4
 in their individual capacities, alleging two 
counts.  Count One asserted violations of the Fourth 
Amendment‘s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s right to privacy and 
comparable rights arising under Pennsylvania law.  Count 
Two alleged a failure to train claim against the County under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
On August 31, 2010, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of County Defendants, 
dismissing Doe‘s case in its entirety.  The District Court 
                                                 
3
 Doe further testified that Foy stopped recording at certain points, 
and that therefore the video did not include certain events and 
conversations that occurred on the day in question.       
4
 Stankus was the Sheriff of Luzerne County in September 2007. 
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stated that, ―[a]lthough the supposed training video was likely 
ill-conceived and definitely poorly executed,‖ the ―case does 
not fall within the zone of privacy protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖  The District Court further determined that the 
alleged search — namely Foy‘s observation and filming of 
Doe‘s partially nude body in the Decontamination Area — 
fell within the ―special needs‖ exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.  Finally, the District Court rejected the failure to 
train claim because it found that there was no ―ultimate 
constitutional injury‖ and so there could not be any claim for 
failure to train.   
Doe appealed.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, which grants the district courts ―original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.‖  We have final-order 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We review the District Court‘s disposition of a 
summary judgment motion de novo, applying the same 
standard as the District Court.  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 
380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 
290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007)).  ―The court shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  All inferences 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
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party.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).   
―A disputed fact is ‗material‘ if it would affect the 
outcome of the suit as determined by the substantive law.‖  
Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248 (1986)).  The nonmoving party cannot establish a 
genuine dispute as to a material fact by pointing to 
unsupported allegations in the pleadings.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  To defeat a motion for 
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must raise more 
than ―some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,‖ 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, and the court must determine 
that ―a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the 
[nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.‖  Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 252.  ―The court may not, however, weigh the 
evidence or make credibility determinations‖ because ―these 
tasks are left for the fact finder.‖  Pichler, 542 F.3d at 386 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).      
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
―The United States Constitution does not mention an 
explicit right to privacy and the United States Supreme Court 
has never proclaimed that such a generalized right exists.‖  
C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 
2005). But see Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 
190, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that the Supreme Court 
―acknowledged the individual‘s constitutional right to 
privacy‖ in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).  
The Supreme Court, however, has found certain constitutional 
―zones of privacy.‖ C.N., 430 F.3d at 178 (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)).  From these zones of 
privacy, we have articulated two types of privacy interests 
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nunez v. Pachman, 
578 F.3d 228, 231 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Malleus v. 
George, 641 F.3d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 2011); C.N., 430 F.3d at 
178.  The first privacy interest is the ―individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,‖ and the second is 
the ―interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.‖  C.N., 430 F.3d at 178; see also 
Malleus, 641 F.3d at 564; Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 
121 (3d Cir. 2000).  The first privacy interest is at issue in this 
matter. 
―‗The right not to have intimate facts concerning one‘s 
life disclosed without one‘s consent‘ is ‗a venerable [right] 
whose constitutional significance we have recognized in the 
 13 
 
past.‘‖  C.N., 430 F.3d at 179 (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 
200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999)).  Justice Brandeis, in 
dissent, famously referred to this as ―the right to be let alone.‖  
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
The touchstone of constitutional privacy protection is 
whether the information at issue is ―within an individual‘s 
reasonable expectations of confidentiality.‖  Malleus, 641 
F.3d at 564; see also C.N., 430 F.3d at 179; Fraternal Order 
of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 112 
(3d Cir. 1987) (―Fraternal Order of Police‖).  The more 
intimate or personal the information, the more reasonable the 
expectation is that it will remain confidential.  Fraternal 
Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 112-13 (citing United States v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 & n.5 (3d 
Cir. 1980)); see also Malleus, 641 F.3d at 564; C.N., 430 F.3d 
at 179.  Indeed, the ―federal constitution . . . protects against 
public disclosure [of] only highly personal matters 
representing the most intimate aspects of human affairs,‖ 
thereby shielding from public scrutiny ―only that information 
which involves deeply rooted notions of fundamental 
personal interests derived from the Constitution.‖  Nunez, 578 
F.3d at 232 (emphasis omitted) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
We have found the following types of information to 
be protected: a private employee‘s medical information that 
was sought by the government; medical, financial and 
behavioral information relevant to a police investigator; a 
public employee‘s prescription record; a minor student‘s 
 14 
 
pregnancy status; sexual orientation; and an inmate‘s HIV-
positive status.  Malleus, 641 F.3d at 565 (citing cases and 
explaining that information encompassed by the 
constitutional right to privacy may be separated into 
categories reflecting sexual, medical and some financial 
information). 
Although the issue of whether one may have a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her 
partially clothed body is a matter of first impression in this 
circuit, other circuits — including the Second, Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits — have held that such a right exists.  See, e.g., 
Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 136-39 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding 
that plaintiff, a female civilian who was participating in a 
police training video, alleged sufficient facts to raise a triable 
issue of whether her constitutional right to privacy was 
violated where the male police officer surreptitiously filmed 
her in the dressing room while topless and without a bra); 
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454-56 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding 
that the plaintiff properly stated a claim for a violation of her 
constitutional right to privacy where she alleged that, while 
reporting a sexual assault, a male police officer deceived her 
into permitting him to photograph her genitals and exposed 
breasts under the pretext of an investigation), cert. denied, 
376 U.S. 939 (1964); Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 
F.3d 489, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a privacy violation 
where a middle school‘s surveillance cameras recorded the 
plaintiff students in their undergarments while in the school 
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locker room).
5
 
Privacy claims under the Fourteenth Amendment 
necessarily require fact-intensive and context-specific 
analyses, and unfortunately, bright lines generally cannot be 
drawn.  The difficulty in drawing a bright line is evident as 
we are not aware of any court of appeals that has adopted 
either a requirement that certain anatomical areas of one‘s 
body, such as genitalia, must have been exposed for that 
person to maintain a privacy claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or a rule that a nonconsensual exposure of 
certain anatomical areas constitutes a per se violation.  See, 
e.g., Poe, 282 F.3d at 136-39 (conducting a context-specific 
analysis); York, 324 F.2d at 454-56 (same); Brannum, 516 
F.3d at 493-500 (same but in the Fourth Amendment context).  
We likewise refuse to draw bright lines based on anatomical 
parts or regions.  Accordingly, we must analyze the specific 
circumstances under which the alleged violation occurred.       
                                                 
5
 Based on existing precedent in the Sixth Circuit, Brannum found 
that the constitutional right to privacy was protected by the Fourth 
Amendment‘s guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  516 F.3d at 494.  Brannum further recognized that other 
circuits have found that the ―same privacy right is located in the 
Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment].‖  Id.  Thus, 
while the Sixth Circuit may locate the right to privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment — and we, as well as the Second and Ninth Circuits, 
locate this right within the Fourteenth Amendment — the contours 
of the right appear to be the same.  See id. (referring to ―the same 
privacy right‖ that other circuits find within the Fourteenth 
Amendment).   
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We conclude that Doe had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy while in the Decontamination Area, particularly while 
in the presence of members of the opposite sex.
6
  The 
Decontamination Area is a large showering facility, and Doe 
permitted only Joyce, a female deputy, to enter for the 
purpose of combing Doe‘s hair in an effort to remove any 
remaining fleas.  Upon entering the Decontamination Area, 
Joyce closed the heavy wooden door to shield Doe‘s privacy 
but could not lock it because the door had no locking 
mechanism.  The record, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Doe, does not support the assertion that Doe expressly or 
implicitly consented to Bobbouine and Foy‘s opening the 
door or filming the events inside the Decontamination Area.  
In fact, Doe testified that she was unaware that Bobbouine 
and Foy were observing her until Bobbouine spoke, and that 
she repeatedly asked Bobbouine and Foy to leave the 
Decontamination Area to no avail.  Joyce then closed the 
Decontamination Area‘s door to again shield Doe‘s privacy.  
Doe clearly had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in 
the Decontamination Area under these circumstances.
7
  Our 
                                                 
6
 In addition to the exposure of Doe‘s body in the Decontamination 
Area, Doe also asserts that Foy‘s filming of the tattoo of 
someone‘s initials on her back led to the discovery of the private 
and intimate fact that she is in a lesbianic relationship.  We note 
that initials of a person generally are not indicative of a person‘s 
gender.  Furthermore, such an assertion is belied by the record, 
which contains no evidence that, as a result of the September 27 
events, anyone learned for the first time that Doe had a girlfriend.     
7
 Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1988), a case relied on 
extensively by County Defendants for the proposition that Doe‘s 
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analysis must then turn to whether Doe‘s exposure meets the 
lofty constitutional standard of the ―most intimate aspects of 
human affairs‖ that involve ―deeply rooted notions of 
fundamental personal interests.‖  Nunez, 578 F.3d at 232.  
Because material facts remain in dispute, we are unable to 
answer that question at this time.   
A dispute of material fact exists as to which of Doe‘s 
body parts were exposed to members of the opposite sex 
and/or filmed while she was in the Decontamination Area.  
County Defendants assert that only Doe‘s back, shoulders 
arms and legs were exposed, and that at no time were Doe‘s 
breasts or buttocks exposed.  Doe has presented evidence, 
however, that her breasts and/or buttocks may have been 
exposed.  Doe asserts that an unknown individual captured on 
the videotape allegedly stated that he could see Doe‘s 
―boobies‖ and told others to ―cover [Doe] up.‖  Doe also 
                                                                                                             
claims are not of constitutional significance, is inapposite.  In 
Davis, one of the plaintiffs was a prisoner who brought 
photographs of his naked wife into prison.  A guard took the 
photographs and displayed them to two inmates.  Id. at 719.   The 
Ninth Circuit held that the prisoner‘s alleged injury was not one of 
constitutional magnitude because the prisoner ―imported the 
photos into the prison environment, a habitat presenting an 
inherent risk of disclosure and a cognizable diminution in [the 
prisoner‘s] reasonable expectations of privacy.‖  Id. at 720.  Doe, 
unlike the prisoner in Bucher, had a higher expectation of privacy 
while she was showering and partially clothed in the 
Decontamination Area.        
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presented evidence to support her claim that the paper sheet 
she used to cover her breasts and buttocks was ―see-through.‖  
This includes: an alleged statement made by Bobbouine and 
captured on video that he ―could see [Doe‘s] ass‖; Doe‘s 
testimony that the outline of her buttocks was visible through 
the wet paper; an alleged statement from an unknown 
individual captured on video stating that Doe had a ―big rip in 
her ass‖ (it is unclear from the record whether this comment 
referred to Doe‘s body or the paper covering her body); and a 
statement from an unknown individual that Doe‘s tan lines 
were visible.  Doe, as the nonmovant, is entitled to have all 
inferences viewed in the light most favorable to her.  See, 
e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.  Under the 
circumstances before us, the issues of whether Doe‘s breasts 
or buttocks were exposed would affect the outcome of the suit 
and thereby are material. 
   The analysis is not complete, however, because a 
person‘s right to avoid disclosure of personal matters is not 
absolute.  See C.N., 430 F.3d at 179; Fraternal Order of 
Police, 812 F.2d at 110.  ―Disclosure may be required if the 
government interest in disclosure outweighs the individual‘s 
privacy interest.‖  Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 110 
(citing Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 
234 (3d Cir. 1985); Westinghouse Electric, 638 F.2d at 577).  
When making such a determination, we apply a ―flexible 
balancing test‖ and consider the following factors:  
[1] the type of record requested, [2] the 
information it does or might contain, [3] the 
potential for harm in any subsequent 
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nonconsensual disclosure, [4] the injury from 
disclosure to the relationship in which the 
record was generated, [5] the adequacy of 
safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, 
[6] the degree of need for access, and [7] 
whether there is an express statutory mandate, 
articulated public policy, or other recognizable 
public interest militating toward access.  
C.N., 430 F.3d at 179-180 (quoting Westinghouse Electric, 
638 F.2d at 578); see also Fraternal Order of Police, 812 
F.2d at 110-11. 
On the record before us, the aforementioned factors 
overwhelmingly weigh in Doe‘s favor.  The type of records at 
issue include photographs of Doe while she is partially 
dressed and an edited video of Doe that may include images 
of, among other things, Doe‘s exposed breasts and/or 
buttocks.  The potential harm of nonconsensual disclosure is 
exacerbated by the existence of the Internet, where one can 
upload image and video files and irretrievably share them 
with the world in a matter of moments.  Doe‘s alleged harm 
could be aggravated by the context of the disclosure, most 
notably the facts that the video of the events was shown to 
others within the workplace and that the alleged violations 
involved superior officers abusing their authority.  The 
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure 
also favors Doe because there is evidence that Foy saved the 
Doe Files in a public computer folder, which Doe testified 
could have been viewed by anyone with access to the Luzerne 
County network.   
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Finally, although factors 6 and 7 could arguably favor 
County Defendants based on their alleged need to create a 
training video of the decontamination process generally, it 
was not necessary for Bobbouine and Foy to observe or film 
Doe while she was partially clothed.  Hospital scrubs were 
available but were not provided to Doe until after Bobbouine 
and Foy‘s alleged misbehavior in the Decontamination Area.8 
Accordingly, dismissing Doe‘s Fourteenth 
Amendment claim was error at this stage, and we will reverse 
and remand this matter to the District Court for further 
proceedings.   
B. SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects the ―right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.‖  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  The phrase ―searches and seizures‖ 
connotes that the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct that is 
―somehow designed to elicit a benefit for the government in 
an investigatory or, more broadly, an administrative 
capacity.‖  United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that a physician employed by the 
government who drew a blood sample from the defendant for 
medical, not investigatory, purposes did not conduct a 
―search‖ under the Fourth Amendment).  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment applies 
                                                 
8
 County Defendants have not asserted a qualified immunity 
defense.   
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to governmental conduct whether ―the government‘s 
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or 
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards.‖  New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted); see also Camara v. Mun. Court of 
S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (applying the Fourth 
Amendment to a governmental inspection program).   
 In Poe v. Leonard, a police officer who invited 
plaintiff to film a training video for the police academy 
surreptitiously videotaped plaintiff in a state of partial dress 
while in her changing room.  282 F.3d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir. 
2002).  The Second Circuit found that this was not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment because the officer‘s 
surreptitious filming during his assigned duties was for his 
―personal reasons‖ and ―occurred outside of a criminal 
investigation or other form of governmental investigation or 
activity.‖  See id.  
 Here, Doe asserts that County Defendants, in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, ―unlawfully searched and seized 
video images‖ of her in the Decontamination Area.  Foy‘s 
conduct of recording and disseminating the video and images 
of Doe was not a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  At oral argument, Doe‘s counsel conceded that 
Foy filmed Doe for personal interest, and that Foy did not 
film Doe in furtherance of any governmental investigation.  
Because Foy acted for personal reasons and outside the scope 
of a governmental investigation, his actions do not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment.  Poe, 282 F.3d at 136-37.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s dismissal of 
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Doe‘s Fourth Amendment claim.9   
C. FAILURE TO TRAIN 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (―§ 1983‖), a municipality 
may be liable for the failure to train its employees only where 
that failure amounts to ―deliberate indifference to the 
[constitutional] rights of persons with whom the police come 
in contact.‖  City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 
(1989); see also Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 
314, 324 (3d Cir. 2005).  In other words, a municipality can 
only be liable under § 1983 where the failure to train 
demonstrates a ―deliberate‖ or ―conscious‖ choice by the 
municipality.   Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 324 (citing City of 
Canton, 489 U.S. at 389).  To determine whether a 
municipality‘s alleged failure to train its employees amounted 
to a deliberate or conscious choice, it must be shown that ―(1) 
municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a 
particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult 
choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the 
wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause 
deprivation of constitutional rights.‖  Carter v. City of Phila., 
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Walker v. N.Y.C., 
974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992)).   
―Moreover, for liability to attach in this circumstance 
                                                 
9
 Because we hold that there was no search or seizure implicating 
the Fourth Amendment, there is no need to consider whether the 
―special needs‖ exception to the Fourth Amendment, which the 
District Court relied on, is applicable under these circumstances.       
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the identified deficiency in a city‘s training program must be 
closely related to the ultimate injury,‖ City of Canton, 489 
U.S. at 391, meaning that the plaintiff must ―prove that the 
deficiency in training actually caused [the constitutional 
violation at issue].‖  Id.; see also Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 325.    
Here, the record does not support Doe‘s claim that the 
County‘s alleged failure to train amounted to deliberate 
indifference towards Doe‘s constitutional rights.  The record 
does not demonstrate that any of the County‘s policymakers 
knew that its employees would likely confront a situation 
implicating the violation of one‘s right to privacy when 
videotaping certain activities.  Similarly, the record is devoid 
of any evidence that there has been a history of County 
employees mishandling the production of training videos or 
videotaping in general; indeed, there is no evidence that there 
has ever been another incident like the one Doe experienced.  
See City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) 
(stating that a ―single incident of unconstitutional activity‖ is 
generally insufficient to make out a claim unless there is 
proof that the incident ―can be attributed to a municipal 
policymaker‖).  Further, it cannot be said that a wrong choice 
by a County employee while producing a training video or 
videotaping in general will frequently cause a deprivation of 
one‘s constitutional right to privacy.  See supra Section III.A 
(stating that the constitutional right to privacy is limited and 
protects public disclosure of only ―highly personal matters 
representing the most intimate aspects of human affairs‖) 
(citing Nunez, 578 F.3d at 231-32).  Consequently, any 
alleged failure by the County to train its employees did not 
amount to deliberate indifference towards Doe‘s 
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constitutional rights. 
In any event, Doe has not produced sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that a deficiency in the County‘s training 
program actually caused the alleged violation of her 
constitutional privacy right.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court‘s dismissal of Doe‘s failure to train claim 
against the County.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
District Court‘s order dismissing Doe‘s constitutional right to 
privacy claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and remand 
the case for further proceedings.  We will affirm the District 
Court‘s order in all other respects.  
